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Abstract
In this paper we study cooperative cost games arising from domination problems on graphs.
We introduce three games to model the cost allocation problem and we derive a necessary and
sucient condition for the balancedness of all three games. Furthermore we study concavity of
these games.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we consider cooperative cost games that arise from domination problems on graphs.
A domination problem consists of a given graph G = (V;E), a positive integer k 2 N, and a
nonnegative function w : V ! R+ that assigns a xed cost to each vertex. A k-dominating set is a
set D  V such that the distance between any vertex in V and at least one vertex in D is at most
k. A k-domination problem is the problem of nding a so-called minimum weighted k-dominating
set of G, i.e. a k-dominating set that minimizes the total cost of its vertices.
Domination problems are widely studied in graph theory. Meir and Moon (1975) investigate
domination problems where the underlying graph is a tree. Some results of Meir and Moon (1975)
are extended to larger classes of graphs in Farber (1981). In Haynes, Hedetniemi, Slater (1998) an
overview of literature on domination problems is given.
An illustration of a domination problem is the following example. Consider a number of regions
in which certain facilities are going to be placed. There is a xed cost for the placement of a facility
in a certain region. The problem is to select the regions in which to place facilities at minimum
costs, such that each region is served by a facility in it or by a facility in a neighbouring region.
The problem of placing the facilities at minimum costs can be regarded as a domination problem.
Let G = (V;E) be the graph where regions correspond to vertices and edges represent pairs of
regions that are neighbours. The xed cost can be described by a map w : V ! R+. The problem
of placing the facilities at minimum cost is equivalent to nding a minimum weighted 1-dominating
set on G.
A natural question that now arises is how to allocate the total costs of placing the facilities
among the participating regions. In this paper we use cooperative game theory to study this
problem. We introduce three cooperative cost games that model the cost allocation problem.
The three dominating set games have in common that the cost of the grand coalition N equals
the minimum weighted k-domination number. However, the cost of coalitions may take dierent
values in each of the three games. This is due to the fact that coalitions have dierent possibilities
of placing the facilities in each of the three games. In the relaxed dominating set game coalitions
are allowed to use every vertex and every edge of the graph. These games belong to the class of
combinatorial optimization games introduced in Deng, Ibaraki, Nagamochi (1999).
1In some situations it makes sense to assume that coalitions will place facilities in their own
region. For instance because regions outside the coalition do not allow the placement of a facility in
their region. Therefore we introduce the intermediate dominating set game. In this game coalitions
are only allowed to place facilities in their own regions. However, coalitions are still allowed to
use every edge of the graph. Consider for example the situation where the facilities are libraries.
Then coalitions will place the libraries in their own regions but inhabitants of one region may freely
travel through regions outside the coalition in order to reach a library.
Now consider a situation where the facilities are power stations. Then coalitions will place
the power stations in their own regions. However, cooperation between non-adjacent members
of a coalition can be obstructed by regions outside the coalition if these regions do not allow
transportation of electricity through their region. For this reason we dene the rigid dominating
set game. In this game coalitions are only allowed to use vertices and edges of the induced subgraph
corresponding to the coalition.
In spite of the dierences between these games, we will obtain a common necessary and sucient
condition for non-emptiness of the cores of all three dominating set games. In particular, if one
of the dominating set games possesses a core element, then the other two dominating set games
possess core elements as well. We also derive relations between the cores of the dominating set
games. Furthermore we present a class of graphs for which the corresponding dominating set games
have a non-empty core for all cost functions w : V ! R+ and all k 2 N. Finally we study concavity
of the dominating set games.
Other game theoretical approaches to location problems include facility location games (Kolen,
Tamir (1990), Tamir (1992)) and minimum spanning forest games (Granot, Granot (1992)). In
Kolen, Tamir (1990) and Tamir (1992) a general class of facility location problems is studied. They
mainly focus on tree graphs, and for these graphs non-emptiness of the core is established. In
Granot, Granot (1992) no restrictions are made on the proximity of the facilities. If the underlying
graph is a tree, non-emptiness of the core is shown.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall notions from cooperative game theory,
graph theory and matrix theory. In Section 3 we introduce three cooperative cost games that model
the cost allocation problem arising from domination problems on graphs. In Section 4 we focus on
the core of the dominating set games. Section 5 is dedicated to concavity and in Section 6 some
nal remarks are made.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we recall some notions from cooperative game theory and introduce some notation.
Also some graph and matrix theoretical concepts are discussed.
2.1 Game theory
A cooperative TU cost game is a pair (N;c) where N = f1;:::;ng is a nite player set, and c, the
characteristic function, is a map c : 2N ! R with c(;) = 0. The map c assigns to each coalition
S  N a real number c(S) called the cost of S. The core of a game (N;c) is the set
C(c) = fx 2 RNj x(S)  c(S) for every S  N and x(N) = c(N)g;
where x(S) denotes
P
j2S xj. Intuitively, the core of a game is the set of cost allocation vectors, for
which no coalition has an incentive to leave the grand coalition N. Note that the core of a game can
be empty. If the core of a game is nonempty, then the game is called balanced. A monotonic game
is a game (N;c) satisfying c(S)  c(T) for every S  T  N. If (N;c) is a balanced monotonic
game and x 2 C(c), then it holds that xi = c(N)  
P
j2Nnfig xj  c(N)   c(Nnfig)  0 for every
2i 2 N. That is, each core element of a monotonic balanced game is nonnegative. A game is called
concave if for all S;T  N it holds that
c(S) + c(T)  c(S [ T) + c(S \ T):
Equivalently, a game is concave if and only if for all i;j 2 N, with i 6= j, and S  Nnfi;jg it holds
that
c(S [ fig)   c(S)  c(S [ fi;jg)   c(S [ fjg):
Hence, for concave games the marginal contribution of a player to any coalition is at most his
marginal contribution to a smaller coalition. Shapley (1971) showed that the core of a concave
game is nonempty.
Let (N;c) be a cooperative cost game, and let  : N ! f1;:::;ng be a bijection. The marginal
vector m(c) is dened as m
i (c) = c([i;])   c((i;)), where [i;] = fj 2 N : (j)  (i)g is the
set of predecessors of i with respect to  including i, and (i;) = fj 2 N : (j) < (i)g is the set
of predecessors of i with respect to  excluding i. Shapley (1971) and Ichiishi (1981) showed that
the set of marginal vectors coincides with the set of extreme points of the core if and only if the
game is concave.
2.2 Graph theory and matrix theory
A graph G is a pair (V;E) where V = f1;:::;ng is a nite set of vertices, and E is the set of edges,
i.e. a set of unordered pairs of V . If (v;w) 2 E for all distinct v;w 2 V , then G is called complete.
The subgraph induced by V 0  V is the graph GV 0 = (V 0;EV 0), where EV 0 is the set of edges having
both endpoints in V 0.
Two distinct vertices v;w 2 V are called adjacent if (v;w) 2 E. For v;w 2 V , a v   w path of
length m is a chain (v;v1;:::;vm 1;w) of pairwise disjoint vertices, where each subsequent pair of
vertices is adjacent, i.e. (v;v1) 2 E, (vi;vi+1) 2 E for all i 2 f1;:::;m   2g and (vm 1;w) 2 E.
A graph is said to be connected if for any two vertices v;w 2 V it contains a v   w path. The
maximal connected parts of a graph are called components.
A graph G = (V;E) is said to be a circuit if it is a connected graph containing n  3 vertices such
that each vertex is adjacent to precisely two other vertices. A circuit containing n vertices is denoted
by Cn. The distance dG(v;w) between v;w is the length of a shortest v   w path. The diameter
(G) is the maximum distance within the graph. For each v 2 V , let eG(v) denote the eccentricity
of v, i.e. eG(v) = maxfdG(v;x) : x 2 V g. The radius r(G) is the minimum over all eccentricities,
i.e. r(G) = minfeG(v) : v 2 V g. For each vertex v 2 V , the k-neighbourhood of v, denoted by
Nk[v], consists of the vertices at distance at most k of v, i.e. Nk[v] = fw 2 V : dG(v;w)  kg. A
k-neighbourhood of v is also called a k-star at v. For technical purposes, we introduce two other
star-like concepts. If T  Nk[v] contains v, then T is called a k-substar at v. The set of k-substars
at j 2 V is denoted by Sj, i.e. Sj = fS  V : S is a k substar at jg. If T  Nk[v], T 6= ;, is such
that dGT(v;x)  k for all x 2 T, then T is called a proper k-substar at v. Note that if T is a proper
k-substar at v, then GT is necessarily connected and contains v. The set of proper k-substars at
j 2 V is denoted by Pj, i.e. Pj = fS  V : S is a proper k substar at jg.
Example 2.1 Let G be the graph depicted in Figure 1. Let k = 2. Then it holds that f1;2;3g
is a 2-star at 1 and that f1;3g is a 2-substar at 1. However, f1;3g is not a proper 2-substar at 1,
since Gf1;3g is a disconnected subgraph and hence dGf1;3g(1;3) = 1. Also note that f1;3g is not a
1-substar at 2 because it does not contain 2 itself.
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Figure 1: It holds that f1;3g is a 2-substar at 1.
Let G = (V;E) be a graph and let T  V . Let GT be the subgraph induced by T and let K  T
be such that the neighbourhoods of j, j 2 K, cover T, i.e. [j2KN
GT
k [j] = T, where N
GT
k [] denote
the neighbourhoods with respect to GT. For future purposes we now show that we can partition
T into disjoint proper k-substars at j, j 2 K. We do this using an algorithm that assigns each
element of T to exactly one element of K. Without loss of generality, assume that K = f1;:::;mg.
Algorithm 1: Construction of disjoint proper k-substars at j, j 2 K, that cover T.
Step 1: Let U0
l = flg for all l 2 K. Set S = TnK and j = 0.
Step 2: If [m
l=1U
j





l [ fi 2 S : dGT(i;l) = jg and S = SnU
j
l . If l = m, then return to Step
2. Else l = l + 1, and return to Step 3.
The following lemma shows that Algorithm 1 indeed produces disjoint proper k-substars at j,
j 2 K.
Lemma 2.1 The sets Uj, j 2 K, produced by Algorithm 1, are disjoint proper k-substars at j that
cover T.
Proof: Because of the phrase S = SnU
j





for all j and all i;l 2 K with i 6= l. Note that, because it holds that [l2KN
GT
k [l] = T, the algorithm
stops after p  k loops. Therefore we only need to show that each U
p
l , l 2 K is a proper k-substar.
Suppose that U
p




(l;j) > k. From
p  k and Step 3 of Algorithm 1 it follows that dGT(l;j)  k. Let (j;a1;:::;ah;l) be a shortest j l
path in GT. Because it holds that dGUp
l
(l;j) > k  dGT(l;j) it follows that there is a g 2 f1;:::;hg
with ag 62 U
p
l . In particular there is an i 2 Knflg with ag 2 U
p
i . Because ag is assigned to i in the
algorithm it either holds that dGT(ag;i) < dGT(ag;l) or that dGT(ag;i) = dGT(ag;l) and i < l. It
follows that it either holds that
dGT(j;i)  dGT(j;ag) + dGT(ag;i) < dGT(j;ag) + dGT(ag;l) = dGT(j;l)
or that
dGT(j;i)  dGT(j;ag) + dGT(ag;i) = dGT(j;ag) + dGT(ag;l) = dGT(j;l) and i < l:
4But this implies that j is assigned to i as well, i.e. j 2 U
p
i . This contradicts j 2 U
p
l . We conclude
that U
p
l is a proper k-substar at l. 2
Let G = (V;E) be a graph and let k 2 N. A set D  V is called a k-dominating set if for
all v 2 V nD it holds that there is a z 2 D with dG(v;z)  k. The k-domination number k(G)
is the minimum number of vertices in a k-dominating set. A fractional k-domination is a vector
of nonnegative weights on the vertices such that for each k-neighbourhood the weights sum up
to at least one. The fractional k-domination number 
k(G) is the minimum sum of the weights
in a fractional k-domination. Let w : V ! R+ be a cost function on the vertices. The weighted
k-domination number k(G;w) is the minimum sum of the costs in a k-dominating set and the
fractional weighted k-domination number 
k(G;w) is the minimum sum of the costs in a fractional
k-domination.
Example 2.2 Let G be the graph depicted in Figure 2, let w1 = (1;1;1;1) and let k = 1. The





3) is an optimal fractional 1-domination. It follows that 1(G;w1) = 2 > 4
3 = 
1(G;w1).
Now let w2 = (10;1;10;1). It holds that (0;1;0;1) is an optimal 1-domination, as well as an






Figure 2: It holds that 1(G;w1) = 2, 
1(G;w1) = 4
3 and 1(G;w2) = 
1(G;w2) = 2.
The k-neighbourhood matrix of G = (V;E) is the n  n-matrix Ak(G), dened by (Ak(G))ij = 1 if
j 2 Nk[i] and (Ak(G))ij = 0 if j 62 Nk[i]. The k-th power of G = (V;E) is the graph Gk = (V;Ek),
where (v;w) 2 Ek if and only if dG(v;w)  k. Note that it holds that Ak(G) = A1(Gk). It holds
that
k(G;w) = minfyw : yAk(G)  1;y 2 f0;1gng  minfyw : yAk(G)  1;y  0g = 
k(G;w):
Let A be a f0;1g-matrix. Then A is called ideal if each extreme point of the polyhedron P =
fx 2 Rn : xA  1;x  0g is integer. It holds that P has only integer extreme points if and only
if minfyw : yA  1;y  0g = minfyw : yA  1;y 2 f0;1gng for all w : V ! R+ (cf. Lehman
(1990)). A f0;1g-matrix is called balanced (cf. Berge (1972)) if it does not contain an odd-sized
square submatrix with exactly two nonzero entries in each row and each column. If A is a balanced
matrix, then A is ideal (cf. Fulkerson et al. (1974)). Note that if Ak(G) is ideal, then it holds that
k(G;w) = 
k(G;w) for every w : V ! R+.
3 The dominating set games
In this section we introduce three cooperative dominating set games that model the cost allocation
problem arising from domination problems on graphs.
5Let G = (V;E) be a graph, k 2 N and w : V ! R+. Dene the corresponding rigid dominat-
ing set game (N;cw
k ) by N = V , and cw
k (S) = k(GS;wS) = minfywS : yAk(GS)  1;y 2 f0;1gSg,
where wS is w restricted to S. In this game, the cost of a coalition equals the minimum weighted
k-domination number of the subgraph induced by this coalition. Obviously, in the rigid dominating
set game, coalitions cannot place facilities in vertices corresponding to non-members. Furthermore,
a coalition can only make use of an edge if both endpoints of this edge are member of the coalition.
The rigid dominating set game is restrictive in the sense that coalitions cannot make use of edges
that are not present in the induced subgraph corresponding to its coalitions. In the intermediate
dominating set game (N;cew
k ) this requirement is dropped. Formally, (N;cew
k ) is dened by N = V ,
and cew
k (S) = minfyw : yAk(G)  e(S);yi = 0 if i 62 S;y 2 f0;1gNg, where e(S) denotes the vector
with each entry corresponding to S equal to one, and zero otherwise.
The relaxed dominating set game is obtained by dropping the requirement that coalitions are only
allowed to use vertices corresponding to members of the coalition. That is, in the relaxed dominat-
ing set game a coalition may place a facility in any vertex present in the graph. Formally, the relaxed
dominating set game is dened by N = V and cvw
k (S) = minfyw : yAk(G)  e(S);y 2 f0;1gNg.
For (N;cvw
k ) it holds that cvw
k (S)  cvw
k (T) for all S  T. Hence, (N;cvw
k ) is a monotonic game.
The relaxed dominating set game is included in the class of combinatorial optimization games,
introduced in Deng et al. (1999).
Example 3.1 Let G be the graph depicted in Figure 1, let w = (3;1;2) and let k = 2. It holds
that cw
2 (f1;3g) = 5, because coalition f1;3g cannot make use of the edges present in the graph.
Because in the intermediate dominating set game coalition f1;3g can make use of the edges (1;2)
and (2;3), it follows that cew
2 (f1;3g) = 2. Finally, cvw
2 (f1;3g) = 1, because coalition f1;3g can
make use of the vertex of player 2.
Remark: Throughout the paper we assume that graphs are connected. For disconnected graphs
the cost allocation problem can be analyzed for each of its components.
Let G = (V;E) be a graph, k 2 N and w : V ! R+. Let (N;cw
k ), (N;cew
k ) and (N;cvw
k ) be
the corresponding dominating set games. Obviously, coalitions have more possibilities of placing
the facilities in the intermediate dominating set game than in the rigid dominating set game. A sim-
ilar observation holds for (N;cew
k ) and (N;cvw
k ), i.e. coalitions have more possibilities of placing the
facilities in the relaxed dominating set game than in the intermediate dominating set game. Hence,
for all S  N it holds that cw
k (S)  cew
k (S)  cvw
k (S). The grand coalition N has the same possi-
bilities in each of the three games. Therefore we have that cw
k (N) = cew
k (N) = cvw
k (N) = k(G;w).
Because making use of edges with endpoints outside the coalition makes no sense if k = 1, it follows
that cw
1 (S) = cew
1 (S) for all S  N.
4 The cores of dominating set games
In this section we study the cores of the three dominating set games. We derive a relation between
the cores, and we provide ecient descriptions of these sets. Furthermore we derive one neces-
sary and sucient condition for the non-emptiness of the cores of the three dominating set games.
Hence, if one of the dominating set games is balanced, then the other two games are balanced
as well. Finally, we obtain graphs with the property that the induced dominating set games are
balanced for all cost functions w : V ! R+.
6Let G = (V;E) be a graph, k 2 N and w : V ! R+. In the previous section we already concluded
that for every S  N it holds that cw
k (S)  cew
k (S)  cvw
k (S) and that cw
k (N) = cew
k (N) = cvw
k (N).
From this we derive that C(cvw
k )  C(cew
k )  C(cw
k ). Moreover, the core of (N;cvw
k ) coincides with
the nonnegative part of the core of (N;cw
k ), as well as with the nonnegative part of the core of
(N;cew
k ).




k ) be the corresponding dominating set games. It holds that C(cvw
k ) = C(cw
k ) \ Rn
+, and
C(cvw
k ) = C(cew
k ) \ Rn
+.
Proof: We only show that C(cvw
k ) = C(cw
k )\Rn
+. The proof of C(cvw
k ) = C(cew
k )\Rn
+ runs similar.
First we show that C(cvw
k )  C(cw
k ) \ Rn
+. As noted before, it holds that C(cvw
k )  C(cw
k ).
Because (N;cvw
k ) is a monotonic game, it holds that x  0 for all x 2 C(cvw
k ). Hence, C(cvw
k ) 
C(cw
k ) \ Rn
+.
Now we show that C(cw
k ) \ Rn
+  C(cvw
k ). Let x 2 C(cw
k ) \ Rn
+. Let T  N be such that
cw
k (T) > cvw
k (T). Obviously, coalition T can save costs by using vertices of NnT. Let K  N
be such that T  [j2KNk[j] and
P
j2K wj = cvw
k (T). Let  T = [j2KNk[j]. It follows that
cw
k ( T) = cvw
k (T). Therefore, x(T)  x(  T)  cw
k ( T) = cvw
k (T), where the rst inequality holds
because x  0 and the second inequality holds because x 2 C(cw
k ). We conclude that it holds that
x(T)  cvw
k (T) for every T  N, and x(N) = cw
k (N) = cvw
k (N). This implies that x 2 C(cvw
k ). 2
Now we provide descriptions of the cores of the three dominating set games. Showing that a
cost allocation vector is a core element, generally boils down to showing that the cost allocated to
a coalition is at most its cost in the corresponding cost game. However, for dominating set games
more ecient core descriptions exist. The following proposition provides a description of the core
of (N;cvw
k ) in terms of coalitions corresponding to k-stars. For the proof of this proposition we
refer to Lemma 2 in Deng et al. (1999).
Proposition 4.1 Let G = (V;E) be a graph, k 2 N and w : V ! R+. Let (N;cvw
k ) be the corre-
sponding relaxed dominating set game. It holds that x 2 C(cvw
k ) if and only if x  0, x(Nk[j])  wj
for each j 2 V and x(N) = cvw
k (N).
Proposition 4.1 provided a description of the core of relaxed dominating set games in terms of
k-stars. Similarly, a core description can be obtained for intermediate dominating set games.
However, this description deals with k-substars instead of k-stars. In other words, an ecient cost
allocation vector is a core element of an intermediate dominating set game if and only if no coalition
corresponding to a k-substar has an incentive to leave the grand coalition.
Proposition 4.2 Let G = (V;E) be a graph, k 2 N and w : V ! R+. Let (N;cew
k ) be the
corresponding intermediate dominating set game. It holds that x 2 C(cew
k ) if and only if for all
j 2 V and all S 2 Sj it holds that x(S)  wj, and x(N) = cew
k (N).
Proof: First we show the "only if" part. Let x 2 C(cew
k ), j 2 V and S 2 Sj. By denition
of k-substars, it holds that j 2 S. Hence, S is a coalition with cost at most wj. It follows that
x(S)  cew
k (S)  wj. Trivially it holds that x(N) = cew
k (N).
Now we show the "if" part. Let x 2 Rn be such that for all j 2 V and all S 2 Sj it holds
that x(S)  wj, and x(N) = cew
k (N). Let T  N. We need to show that x(T)  cew
k (T).









j2K wj = cew
k (T). Therefore we have that x 2 C(cew
k ). 2
Finally we consider the core of rigid dominating set games. In Proposition 4.3 we provide a
description of the core of this set similar to the descriptions of the cores of the relaxed and the
intermediate dominating set games. It states that an ecient cost allocation vector is in the core
if and only if no coalition corresponding to a proper k-substar has an incentive to leave the grand
coalition.
Proposition 4.3 Let G = (V;E) be a graph, k 2 N and w : V ! R+. Let (N;cw
k ) be the
corresponding rigid dominating set game. It holds that x 2 C(cw
k ) if and only if for all j 2 V and
all S 2 Pj it holds that x(S)  wj, and x(N) = cw
k (N).
Proof: First we show the "only if" part. Let x 2 C(cw
k ), j 2 V and S 2 Pj. It holds that S
is a coalition with cost at most wj. It follows that x(S)  cw
k (S)  wj. Trivially it holds that
x(N) = cw
k (N).
Now we show the "if" part. Let x 2 Rn be such that for every j 2 V and S 2 Pj it holds
that x(S)  wj, and x(N) = cw
k (N). Let T  N. We need to show that x(T)  cw
k (T).




j2K wj and [j2KN
GT
k [j] = T. According to Lemma 2.1 there exist disjoint









where the inequality follows from our assumption. 2
In the remainder of this section we focus on the balancedness of the dominating set games. The
main theorem of this section provides a necessary and sucient condition for non-emptiness of the
core of the three games. It states that the games are balanced if and only if the fractional weighted
k-domination number equals the weighted k-domination number.




k ) be the corresponding dominating set games. The following statements are equivalent:
1. k(G;w) = 
k(G;w)
2. (N;cvw
k ) is balanced
3. (N;cew
k ) is balanced
4. (N;cw
k ) is balanced.
Proof: The equivalence of 1 and 2 follows from Theorem 2 in Deng et al. (1999). "2 ) 3" and "3
) 4" follow from the observation that C(cvw
k )  C(cew
k )  C(cw
k ). So we only need to show that
"4 ) 2". We will do this by showing that if C(cw
k ) 6= ;, then there exists an x 2 C(cw
k ) such that
x  0. This implies, according to Theorem 4.1, that x 2 C(cvw
k ).
Suppose that C(cw
k ) 6= ;. Consider the following algorithm. We will show that this algorithm
produces a nonnegative core element.
8Algorithm 2: Construction of a nonnegative core element of C(cw
k ).
Step 1: Let x 2 C(cw
k ), p = 1 and xp = x.
Step 2: If xp  0, then stop. Else go to step 3.





















j for all j 2 Nnfip;jpg. Let p = p+1, and return to
step 2.
For showing that Algorithm 2 produces a nonnegative core element, we rst show that xp 2 C(cw
k )
for all p. Note that x1 2 C(cw
k ). Suppose that xp 2 C(cw
k ), and that xp 6 0. We will show that
xp+1 2 C(cw




j > 0g. Let (ip;a1;:::;am;jp) be a shortest
ip  jp path. By denition of ip and jp it holds that xa1 = ::: = xam = 0. Let P = fa1;:::;am;jpg
be the set of players on the shortest ip   jp path excluding ip.
According to Proposition 4.3, showing that xp+1 2 C(cw
k ) boils down to showing that for all
l 2 N and all U 2 Pl it holds that xp+1(U)  cw
k (U). Because it holds that xp 2 C(cw
k ), we only
need to consider proper k-substars for which the allocated cost at xp+1 is (strictly) larger than
the allocated cost at xp. In particular, we only need to consider coalitions containing ip and not
containing jp. So let l 2 N and let U 2 Pl be such that ip 2 U and jp 62 U. We distinguish between
two cases.
Case 1: U [ P 2 Pl.
From xp 2 C(cw
k ) and the assumption that U [ P is a proper k-substar at l we obtain that P
q2U[P x
p
q  wl. Because x
p




q  wl   x
p
jp: (1)































ip = wl   x
p
jp + p  wl;
where the rst inequality follows from (1) and the last inequality from p  x
p
jp.
Case 2: U [ P 62 Pl.
First suppose that l = ip. Because of the assumption that U[P is not a proper k-substar at ip it
follows that dG(ip;jp) > k. For all j 2 U it holds that dG(ip;j)  k. Hence, by denition of ip and
jp, it follows that x
p
j  0 for all j 2 Unfipg. Since x
p+1




j  0  wip.
So suppose that l 6= ip. Let W = fj 2 U : dGU(j;l) = dGU(j;ip) + dGU(ip;l)g be the set of
vertices in U for which a shortest path to l uses ip. By Lemma A.1 of the Appendix it follows
that UnW is a proper k-substar at l. This implies, using Lemma A.2 of the Appendix, that
dG(q;ip) < dG(jp;ip) for all q 2 W. Using the denition of ip and jp it follows that x
p+1
q  0 for
































where the rst inequality holds because UnW is a proper k-substar at l. The last inequality follows
from x
p
q  0 for all q 2 W and x
p+1
ip  0.
We conclude that xp+1 2 C(cw
k ). Hence, xp 2 C(cw
k ) for all p. Now we show that the algo-
rithm converges to a nonnegative core element. Let xp and xp+1 be two core elements produced
by the algorithm. Note that either x
p+1
jp = 0 and x
p+1
ip  0, or x
p+1
jp  0 and x
p+1
ip = 0. Hence,
xp+1 contains at least one zero entry more than xp. Because xp is a nite dimensional vector, the
algorithm produces a nonnegative core element in a nite number of steps. 2
Example 4.1 Let G, k, w1 and w2 be as in Example 2.2. Because it holds that k(G;w1) 6=






k ) and (N;cv
w1
k ) are not balanced. Because it holds that k(G;w2) = 
k(G;w2)




k ) and (N;cv
w2
k ) contain core elements.
The cores of the dominating set games are non-empty if and only if it holds that k(G;w) =

k(G;w). Unfortunately, the problem of determining k(G;w) is NP-complete on general graphs.
Hence, it is dicult to determine whether k(G;w) = 
k(G;w). For some classes of graphs however,
the k-domination problem is relatively easy to solve. For example, a special subclass of chordal
graphs satises this property.
A graph is called chordal if it does not contain a circuit of length at least four as an induced
subgraph. A sun is a chordal graph on 2n vertices for some n  3, whose vertex set can be
partitioned into two sets, W = fw1;:::;wng and U = fu1;:::;ung such that any two vertices of
W are nonadjacent, and for each i;j 2 f1;:::;ng, wi is adjacent to uj if and only if i = j or
i = j + 1 (mod n). A graph is called an odd (even) sun if it is a sun on 2n vertices, with n odd
(even). An (odd-)sun-free chordal graph is a chordal graph which does not contain a (odd-)sun as
an induced subgraph. Sun-free chordal graphs are called strongly chordal graphs in Farber (1981).
The concept of an even sun is illustrated in the following example.
Example 4.2 Let G be the graph depicted in Figure 3. Observe that G is chordal. Moreover, the
sets W = fw1;:::;w6g and U = fu1;:::;u6g form a partition of the vertex set. Any two vertices
of W are nonadjacent, and, wi is connected to uj if and only if i = j or i = j + 1 (mod 6). Hence,
G is a sun. Because jUj = jWj = 6 we conclude that G is an even sun.
If a graph is sun-free chordal, then it is necessarily odd-sun-free chordal. Trees, line graphs of
trees, interval graphs and block graphs are examples of sun-free chordal graphs (cf. Farber (1981)).
Furthermore, Farber (1981) constructed a polynomial time test to determine if a graph is sun-free
chordal. Theorem 4.3 states that odd-sun-free chordal graphs are characterized by the balancedness
of their 1-neighbourhoodmatrices.
Theorem 4.3 (Brouwer et al. (1984)) Let G = (V;E) be a graph. Then A1(G) is balanced if
and only if G is an odd-sun-free chordal graph.
Lubiw (1982) showed that powers of sun-free chordal graphs are sun-free chordal. Hence, for a
sun-free chordal graph G it holds that Ak(G) = A1(Gk) is balanced for all k 2 N. Therefore it
holds that k(G;w) = 























































































Figure 3: An even sun.
Proposition 4.4 Dominating set games arising from sun-free chordal graphs are balanced for all
w : V ! R+ and all k 2 N.
It does not hold that powers of odd-sun-free chordal graphs are necessarily odd-sun-free chordal.
For example, let G be the 6-sun depicted in Figure 3. Let H be the subgraph of G2 induced by
fw1;:::;w6g. This subgraph is a circuit on 6 vertices, and hence not chordal. It follows that G2 is
not odd-sun-free chordal.
Trivially circuits with at least four vertices are not chordal graphs. Hence, these graphs are
not sun-free chordal. However, Cornu ejols and Novick (1994) showed that A1(C6) and A1(C9) are
ideal matrices. Moreover, they showed that A1(C6) and A1(C9) are the only ideal matrices of the
form Ak(Cn) with k;n 2 N such that k  n 2
2 . Note that if k > n 2
2 , then Ak(Cn) is the matrix
with every entry a one.
Theorem 4.4 (Cornu ejols, Novick (1994)) It holds that A1(C6) and A1(C9) are ideal.
From Theorem 4.4 it follows that 1(C6;w) = 
1(C6;w) and 1(C9;w) = 
1(C9;w) for every
w : V ! R+. Hence, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.5 Dominating set games arising from C6 or C9 are balanced for all w : V ! R+
and k = 1.
5 Concavity of dominating set games
In this section we consider concavity of dominating set games. For general cost functions on the
vertices, dominating set games will not satisfy concavity. For the cost function wi = 1 for all i 2 V
however, there exist interesting characterizations of concavity of dominating set games. Contrary
to balancedness of dominating set games, the characterizations of concavity do not coincide for the
three dominating set games.
First we derive a characterization of concavity of relaxed dominating set games. Let G = (V;E)
be a graph, k 2 N and let wi = 1 for all i 2 V . The corresponding relaxed dominating set game is
concave if and only if there exists a vertex with distance at most k to the other vertices.
Proposition 5.1 Let G = (V;E) be a graph, k 2 N and wi = 1 for all i 2 V . Let (N;cv1
k) be
the corresponding relaxed dominating set game. It holds that (N;cv1
k) is concave if and only if
k  r(G).
11Proof: It holds that k  r(G) if and only if there is an x 2 V with Nk[x] = V . We will show that
(N;cv1
k) is concave if and only if there is an x 2 V with Nk[x] = V .
First we show the "if" part. Suppose there is an x 2 V such that Nk[x] = V . Then it holds
that cv1
k(S) = 1 for all S  N, S 6= ;. Hence, (N;cv1
k) is concave.
Now we prove the "only if" part. Suppose that for all x 2 V it holds that Nk[x] 6= V . We will
show that (N;cv1
k) is not concave.
Let v 2 V be such that Nk[v] is a maximal k-neighbourhood in the sense that it is not a
proper subset of any other k-neighbourhood. Note that each graph contains such a vertex, so in
particular does G contain such a vertex. Because of our assumption it holds that Nk[v] 6= V . Now
let y 2 V be such that dG(v;y) = k + 1. Hence, y 62 Nk[v]. It follows that Nk[v] \ Nk[y] 6= ;.
This implies that cv1
k(Nk[v]) = 1, cv1
k(Nk[y]) = 1 and cv1
k(Nk[v] \ Nk[y]) = 1. Because it holds
that Nk[v] is a maximal k-neighbourhood and y 62 Nk[v] it follows that cv1
k(Nk[v] [ Nk[y]) = 2.
Hence, cv1
k(Nk[v] \ Nk[y]) + cv1




k) is not concave. 2
Example 5.1 Let G be the graph depicted in Figure 4. It holds that r(G) = 2. From Proposition
5.1 it follows that the corresponding relaxed dominating set game (N;cv1











Figure 4: A graph for which r(G) = 2 and (G) = 3.
Now we consider concavity of rigid dominating set games. We will characterize concavity for these
games in case wi = 1 for all i 2 V . For this we need to introduce the concept of block graphs.
A vertex is called a cutvertex if the subgraph (V nfvg;EV nfvg) consists of more components
than G. A bridge is an edge e 2 E with the same property, i.e. if (V;Enfeg) has more components
than G. A graph is called 2-connected if it has at least three vertices and contains no cutvertex.
A subgraph B is called a block if it is a bridge or a maximal 2-connected subgraph. A graph is a
block graph if every block is complete. Note for example that a tree is a block graph. The concept
of block graphs is illustrated in the following example.
Example 5.2 Let G be the graph depicted in Figure 5. The vertices 5;6 and 9 are cutvertices, and
the edge (5;6) is a bridge. The blocks are f1;2;3;4;5g, f5;6g, f6;7;8;9g and f9;10;11g. Because
each of these blocks forms a complete subgraph, it follows that G is a block graph.
The following lemma, which is needed for our characterization of concave rigid dominating set
games, provides a relation between the radius and the diameter of a blockgraph.
Lemma 5.1 Let k 2 N and let G = (V;E) be a block graph satisfying (G)  2k. Then it holds
that r(G)  k.
Proof: Block graphs are 3-sun-free chordal graphs. For 3-sun free chordal graphs it holds that
r(G) = d
(G)
2 e (cf. Theorem 3.6 in Chang and Nemhauser(1984)). Hence, if G is a blockgraph




























































Figure 5: A block graph.
With the aid of the previous lemma, we now provide a characterization of concave rigid domi-
nating set games.
Proposition 5.2 Let G = (V;E) be a graph, k 2 N and wi = 1 for all i 2 V . Let (N;c1
k) be the
corresponding rigid dominating set game. It holds that (N;c1
k) is concave if and only if G is a block
graph satisfying (G)  2k.
Proof: First we show the "only if" part. Suppose that G does not satisfy (G)  2k. Let v;w 2 V








k(fv;a1;:::;a2k;wg) = 3 > 2 = c1
k(fv;a1;:::;a2kg)+c1
k(fa1;:::;a2k;wg).
We conclude that (N;c1
k) is not concave.
Now suppose that G is not a block graph. Then there is a block which is not complete. Hence, G












Figure 6: A graph for which (N;c1
k) is not concave.
Case 1: G contains Cm as an induced subgraph with 4  m  2k + 2.
Let x and y be vertices of Cm with (x;y) 62 E. In Cm there are two disjoint paths (x;a1;:::;ai;y)
and (x;b1;:::;bj;y). Because (x;y) 62 E, it holds that i  1 and j  1. Therefore, c1
k(fx;yg) = 2,
c1
k(fx;a1;:::;ai;yg) = 1, c1
k(fx;b1;:::;bj;yg) = 1 and c1
k(fx;a1;:::;ai;y;b1;:::;bjg)  1. Thus,
c1
k(fx;yg) + c1




k) is not concave.
Case 2: G contains Cm as an induced subgraph with m > 2k + 2.
Let x;y;w be vertices of Cm such that (x;w) 2 E, and (w;y) 2 E. Let H = Cmnfwg be the
induced subgraph of Cm obtained by deleting w. Then G contains an induced subgraph H and two
13vertices x;y 2 H such that dH(x;y)  2k + 1. It follows that (N;c1
k) is not concave.
Case 3: G contains the graph depicted in Figure 6 as an induced subgraph.
Then it holds that c1
k(f2;4g) = 2, c1
k(f1;2;4g) = 1, c1
k(f2;3;4g) = 1,c1
k(N) = 1. Hence,
c1
k(f2;4g) + c1
k(N) = 3 > 2 = c1
k(f1;2;4g) + c1
k(f2;3;4g). Therefore, (N;c1
k) is not concave.
Now we show the "if" part. Let G = (V;E) be a block graph and let k 2 N. Suppose that G
satises (G)  2k. Let (N;c1
k) be the corresponding rigid dominating set game. If T  N is
such that GT is a connected subgraph of G, then it holds that GT is again a block graph satisfying
(GT)  2k. Hence it follows from Lemma 5.1, that there is an x 2 T with dGT(x;y)  k for every
y 2 T. As a result, c1
k(T) = 1 for every connected T  N.
Now let i;j 2 N, with i 6= j, and S  Nnfi;jg. Let S1;:::;Sp be the components of S in G.
Obviously, c1
k(S) = p. Let I  f1;:::;pg be the index set of the components that are connected
via vertex i. That is, for all l 2 I there is a m 2 Sl with (m;i) 2 E. Similarly, let J  f1;:::;pg
be the index set of the components that are connected via vertex j.
First we will show that jI \ Jj  1. Suppose that jI \ Jj  2. Then at least two components,
say S1 and S2, are connected both via vertices i and j. Let m1;m2 2 S1 such that (m1;i) 2 E
and (m2;j) 2 E, and let m3;m4 2 S2 such that (m3;i) 2 E and (m4;j) 2 E. Let P1  S1 be
the set of vertices corresponding to a shortest m1   m2 path in GS1, and let P2  S2 be the set
of vertices corresponding to a shortest m3   m4 path in GS2. It holds that the subgraph induced
by P1 [ P2 [ fi;jg forms a 2-connected subgraph of G. Because G is a block graph, it follows
that this subgraph is complete. This implies that (m1;m3) 2 E, contradicting that S1 and S2 are
disconnected. We conclude that jI \ Jj  1.
Note that it holds that c1
k(S [ fig) = p   jIj + 1 and c1
k(S [ fjg) = p   jJj + 1. If it holds that
jI \ Jj = 0 and (i;j) 62 E or that jI \ Jj = 1 and (i;j) 2 E, then it holds that c1
k(S [ fi;jg) =
p   jIj   jJj + 2. If it holds that jI \ Jj = 0 and (i;j) 2 E or that jI \ Jj = 1 and (i;j) 62 E, then
it follows that c1
k(S [fi;jg) = p jIj jJj+1. We conclude that c1
k(S [fi;jg)  p jIj jJj+2.
Therefore,
c1
k(S [ fig) + c1
k(S [ fjg) = 2p   jIj   jJj + 2  c1
k(S) + c1
k(S [ fi;jg): 2
The previous proposition is illustrated in Example 5.3.
Example 5.3 Let G be the graph depicted in Figure 7. Clearly, G is a blockgraph and (G) = 3.
From Proposition 5.2 it follows that the corresponding rigid dominating set game (N;c1
k) is concave

















Figure 7: A graph for which (N;c1
k) is concave for k  2.
The nal part of this section is dedicated to concavity of intermediate dominating set games. We
provide a characterization of concavity if wi = 1 for all i 2 V . Let G = (V;E) be a graph, and
let wi = 1 for all i 2 V . First note that for k = 1 the corresponding intermediate dominating set
14game coincides with the rigid dominating set game. From Theorem 5.2 we obtain that (N;ce1
1) is
concave if and only if G is a block graph satisfying (G)  2. However, for k  2, the intermediate
dominating set game does not necessarily coincide with the rigid dominating set game. Therefore
the characterizations of concavity of these two games are not the same. In fact, intermediate
dominating set games are concave if and only if the diameter of G is at most k.
Proposition 5.3 Let G = (V;E) be a graph, k  2, and wi = 1 for all i 2 V . Let (N;ce1
k) be the
corresponding intermediate dominating set game. It holds that (N;ce1
k) is concave if and only if
(G)  k.
Proof: We note that (G)  k if and only if Nk[v] = V for all v 2 V . First we show the "if" part.
Suppose that G is such that Nk[v] = V for all v 2 V . Then it holds that ce1
k(S) = 1 for all S  N.
Trivially, (N;ce1
k) is concave.
Now we show the "only if" part. Suppose that there is an x 2 V such that Nk[x] 6= V . Then
there exists a y 2 V such that dG(x;y) = k + 1. Let (x;a1;:::;ak;y) be a shortest x   y path.
Note that, because k  2, it holds that a1 6= ak. Therefore ce1
k(fx;yg) = 2, ce1
k(fx;a1;yg) = 1,
ce1
k(fx;ak;yg) = 1 and ce1
k(fx;a1;ak;yg) = 1. It follows that ce1
k(fx;a1;ak;yg)+ce1




Example 5.4 Let G be the graph depicted in Figure 4. It holds that (G) = 3. From Proposition
5.3 it follows that the corresponding intermediate dominating set game (N;ce1
k) is concave if and
only if k  3.
6 Concluding remarks
In this section we make some nal remarks on the structure of the core of dominating set games.
We show that a special subclass of relaxed dominating set games satises the CoMa-property and
we make some suggestions for further research.
A balanced game is said to satisfy the CoMa-property if it holds that the extreme points of the
core are marginal vectors. Obviously, all concave games satisfy the CoMa-property. The contrary
does not necessarily hold (cf. Kuipers (1993) and Hamers et al.(2002)).
Proposition 6.1 Let G = (V;E) be a graph, k 2 N and wi = 1 for all i 2 V . Let (N;cv1
k) be
the corresponding relaxed dominating set game. If Gk is odd-sun-free chordal, then it holds that
(N;cv1
k) satises the CoMa-property.
Proof: We need to show that each extreme point of the core of (N;cv1
k) is a marginal vector. In
order to do so, we rst show that each extreme point of C(cv1
k) is integer, i.e. consists of ones and
zeros.
Because Gk is odd-sun-free chordal, it follows from Theorem 4.3 that A1(Gk) = Ak(G) is
balanced. This implies that each extreme point of the polyhedron Q = fx 2 Rn : Ak(G)x 




i2N yi : yAk(G)  1;y 2 f0;1gng = minf
P
i2N yi : yAk(G)  1;y  0g. From
the Duality theorem of linear programming it follows that minf
P
i2N yi : yAk(G)  1;y  0g =
maxf
P
i2N xi : Ak(G)x  1;x  0g. This implies that for all x 2 Q it holds that
P
i2N xi  cv1
k(N).
From Theorem 4.1 it follows that
C(cv1
k) = Q \ fx 2 Rn : x(N) = cv1
k(N)g:
15It holds that C(cv1
k) is a facet of Q, and hence that C(cv1
k) has only integral extreme points.
Now let x be an extreme point of C(cv1
k). Then each entry of x is equal to 0 or 1. Let S  N
be such that i 2 S if and only if xi = 1. Furthermore, let  : N ! f1;:::;ng be a bijection such
that (i)  jSj for all i 2 S. That is,  begins with the members of S and ends with the members
of NnS. Note that cv1
k(N) =
P
i2S xi. We will show that m(v) = x.
Let j 2 S. Because x is a core element it holds that cv1
k([j;]) 
P
i2[j;] xi = j[j;]j. Trivially
it holds that j[j;]j  cv1
k([j;]). Hence, cv1
k([j;]) = j[j;]j. Similarly it follows that cv1
k((j;)) =




k((j;)) = j[j;]j   j(j;)j = 1 = xj.
Now let j 2 NnS, and let i 2 S be such that (i) = jSj. It holds that cv1
k(S) = j[i;]j = cv1
k(N).
From the monotonicity of (N;cv1
k) it follows that cv1
k([j;]) = cv1
k((j;)) = cv1





k((j;)) = j[i;]j   j[i;]j = 0 = xj.
Hence, m(cv1
k) = x. Therefore (N;cv1
k) satises the CoMa-property. 2
Unfortunately, Proposition 6.1 does not extend to arbitrary cost functions. This is illustrated
in the following example.
Example 6.1 Let G be the graph depicted in Figure 8 and let k = 1. Clearly, G is an odd-sun-
free chordal graph. Let the cost function be given by w = (6;4;4;4). For the relaxed dominating
set game (N;cvw
1 ) it holds that cvw
1 (S) = 4 if S 2 f1;2;3;4;12;13;14g and cvw
1 (S) = 6 if S 2
f23;24;34;123;124;134;234;1234g. It is straightforward to check that (3;1;1;1) 2 ext(C(cvw
1 )).










Figure 8: A graph for which (N;cvw
1 ) does not satisfy the CoMa-property for all w : V ! R+.
In the proof of Proposition 6.1 we only use that A(G) is balanced and that the cost function equals
wi = 1 for all i 2 V . Hence, the proof can be used to show that combinatorial optimization games
with cost function consisting of ones and a balanced matrix satisfy the CoMa-property. This gives
rise to the question whether there exist other relations between the structure of a f0;1g-matrix
and the structure of the core of a combinatorial optimization games.
Another interesting question is whether dominating set games and intermediate dominating set
games satisfy CoMa for odd-sun-free chordal graphs and cost function wi = 1 for all i 2 V .
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17Appendix
Lemma A.1 Let G = (V;E) be a graph and k 2 N. Let ip;l 2 V be distinct and let U be a proper
k-substar at l with ip 2 U. Let W = fj 2 U : dGU(j;l) = dGU(j;ip) + dGU(ip;l)g. Then it holds
that UnW is a proper k-substar at l.
Proof: Suppose that UnW is not a proper k-substar at l. Then there is a q 2 UnW with
dGUnW(q;l) > k  dGU(q;l), where the second inequality holds because U is a proper k-substar at
l. Because the length of every shortest q   l path in GUnW is strictly larger than the length of
every shortest m l path in GU, it must hold that every shortest m l path in GU uses an element
j 2 W. Hence, dGU(m;l) = dGU(m;j)+dGU(j;l). Because j 2 W it follows by denition of W that
dGU(j;l) = dGU(j;ip)+dGU(ip;l). We conclude that dGU(q;l) = dGU(q;j)+dGU(j;ip)+dGU(ip;l),
which implies that there is a shortest q l path in GU which uses ip. Therefore q 2 W, contradicting
q 2 UnW. As a result we have that UnW is a proper k-substar at l. 2
Lemma A.2 Let G = (V;E) be a graph and k 2 N. Let ip;jp;l 2 V be distinct and let U be a
proper k-substar at l with ip 2 U and jp 62 U. Let (ip;a1;:::;am;jp) be a shortest ip   jp path in
G, and let P = fa1;:::;am;jpg. Finally, let W = fj 2 U : dGU(j;l) = dGU(j;ip) + dGU(ip;l)g.
Suppose that U [ P is not a proper k-substar at l. Then it holds that dG(q;ip) < dG(ip;jp) for all
q 2 W.
Proof: Let q 2 W. Because U is a proper k-substar it holds that dGU(q;l)  k. It holds that
U [ P is not a proper k-substar at l, hence, dGU[P(jp;ip) + dGU[P(ip;l) > k. This implies that
dGU[P(jp;ip) + dGU[P(ip;l) > k  dGU(q;l)
= dGU(q;ip) + dGU(ip;l)  dGU(q;ip) + dGU[P(ip;l); (2)
where the equality holds because q 2 W. From (2) we obtain that dGU[P(jp;ip) > dGU(q;ip). This
implies that
dG(q;ip)  dGU(q;ip) < dGU[P(jp;ip) = dG(jp;ip): 2
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